Consciousness is, perhaps, the aspect of our mental lives that is the most perplexing for both psychologists and philosophers. Daniel Dennett has described it as 'both the most obvious and the most mysterious feature of our minds' and attempts at definition often seem to move in circles. Thomas Nagel famously remarked that 'without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless.' These observations might suggest that consciousness - indefinable and mysterious - falls outside (...) the scope of rational enquiry, defying both scientific and philosophical investigation. In reality, however, the topic has been a focus of psychological investigation since William James and is increasingly vital in philosophical research. This book illustrates the various, interdisciplinary approaches to the problem, providing both pointers to a solution and a summary of the key positions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt by Tim MilnesMargaret WatkinsTim Milnes. The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. viii + 278. Hardback. ISBN: 9780198812739. $91.00.In his brief autobiography, “My Own Life,” Hume reports that “almost all [his] life has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations” (E-MOL: xxxi). This is one (...) of at least ten places in this brief work in which he associates himself with “letters” or “literature”—as compared to at most four associations with philosophy. The moral to be inferred is not that Hume considered himself not to be a philosopher. Rather, he conceived of philosophy as a kind of literature. The Treatise was itself a “literary attempt.” Indeed, opposition between the “literary” and “philosophical” aspects of a text would have been foreign to Hume and his contemporaries—a notion for a later age, despite his occasional loose distinction between the relevant genres, as in his list of writings “historical, philosophical, or literary” in “My Own Life” (E-MOL: xxxvi).Yet despite Hume’s own understanding of the continuity between philosophy and literature, broadly conceived, it is still common for contemporary philosophers to ignore literary questions in their examination of Hume’s work, or to presume that one can easily distinguish the “philosophical” parts from the “literary” ones. Tim Milnes’s The Testimony of Sense is therefore a welcome addition to the Hume literature (pun intended). With a particular focus on the essay—a genre of great importance to Hume—Milnes contributes to the small set of engagements with Hume from the disciplinary perspective of English literature. With training in both philosophy and literature, as well as established expertise on Romanticism and its own essays, Milnes is well-qualified for the task. The Testimony of Sense includes sustained engagement with Hume’s contemporaries and successors, but for the purposes of this review, I engage the book primarily as a Hume scholar for Hume scholars.Milnes’s story plays out in three acts. The first establishes the need for public trust created by a skeptical crisis, itself a product of Hume’s criticism of the epistemic program of thinkers in the Cartesian and Lockean traditions. The second explains how the essays of the long eighteenth century constitute a response to that need in various ways. The third reveals in detail how the Romantic essayists, particularly William Hazlitt and Charles Lamb, both respond to and deviate from the “neoclassical” essayists, typified by Hume and Samuel Johnson.The first chapter, “Self and Intersubjectivity,” lays the groundwork by articulating how Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart identify the need for what we now call intersubjectivity. Milnes describes the common thread as a kind of “natural transcendentalism.” In what sense are these thinkers properly understood as [End Page 175] transcendentalists? The central idea seems to be that all posit things other than reason as “conditions of meaningful thought” (72). For Hume, it is the social, linguistic experience of a community of virtuous judges. The intricate relations between self and other essential to such a community get “internalized within the specular drama of the impartial spectator” (72) in Smith’s writing, which itself takes part in the drama through his “halting, qualified syntax” that mimics “everyday speech” (44). Reid posits a “prescience” of trust, which grounds our reliance on both human testimony and the uniformity of nature, itself undergirded by the design of a benevolent God. Stewart, who posits axiomatic truths that help constitute the “stamina of intellect,” goes furthest, actually calling these truths transcendental (55). This chapter also puts these eighteenth-century thinkers in conversation with twentieth-century theorists, including Habermas, Davidson, and Rorty.Chapter 2, “The Subject of Trust,” deepens the analysis by situating these “natural transcendentalisms” in the broader enlightenment context. In contrast to Descartes, Bacon, and Locke, who were suspicious of our reliance on the opinions of others, the eighteenth-century thinkers understand trust as prior to reason in various ways—though not prior to solidarity. The particulars in each case depend on their responses to skepticism and their accounts of the relation between... (shrink)

Jacques Maritain's An Introduction to Philosophy was first published in 1931. Since then, this book has stood the test of time as a clear guide to what philosophy is and how to philosophize. Inspired by the Thomistic Revival called for by Leo XIII, Maritain relies heavily on Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to shape a philosophy that, far from sectarian theology in disguise, is driven by reason and engages the modern world. Re-released as part of the Sheed & Ward (...) Classic series, An Introduction to Philosophy is sure to enliven the minds of students and general readers for years to come. From the new introduction by Ralph McInerny: You are about to read a magnificent introduction not only to a kind of philosophy but to philosophizing itself. Jacques Maritain was a relatively young man when he wrote this book, but his effort is one that attracts any philosopher more and more as he grows older. However odd and unusual what he says becomes, the philosopher yearns to show how even the most abstruse claims can be put into relation with what the reader already knows. That, in its essence, is what teaching is. In this book, the reader will find a wise and certain guide into philosophizing as such. And, in the end, he will find that what he reads is really only a refinement and development of what he and everybody else already knew. (shrink)

It would certainly be an exaggeration to say that there has been a plethora of work on Neo-Kantianism in recent years. There has, however, been a modest increase, due not only to Köhnke's work but also to Hans-Ludwig Ollig's Der Neukantianismus and Materialien zur Neukantianismus-Diskussion, Thomas Willey's Back To Kant, and Werner Flach's and Helmut Holzey's Erkenntnistheorie und Logik in Neukantianismus. On several counts there is reason to suspect, or at least to hope, that this tendency will continue. For (...) much remains to be done. The paucity of literature on Neo-Kantianism, especially in English, is apparent and stands in need of rectification. Also, the complexity of the historical situation in Germany during the relevant period may have implications that force a revision of the standard picture of nineteenth century European philosophy. Finally, it is far from obvious that the Neo-Kantians had no independent philosophical insight relevant to issues in a wide range of contemporary areas: epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, ethics and Kant scholarship, to mention but a few. (shrink)

Watkins sets out in this book to provide an answer for Humean scepticism as it affects the philosophy of science. His carefully argued conclusions display the great fruitfulness--and limits--of the basic approach pioneered by Karl Popper. The development here goes well beyond Popper's own work, but is more in tune with it than, say, the latter-day views of Imre Lakatos.

C. I. Lewis’s conception of the given element in perceptual experience was one of the targets of Sellars’ famous charge that many such conceptions fall victim to the Myth of the Given. Yet exactly what makes a conception of the given mythical has remained unclear. Here I aim to clarify this issue by discussing Eric Watkins’ recent claim that a conception exactly like the one Lewis articulated in Mind and the World Order in fact avoids the Myth. Watkins motivates this (...) claim in part by raising objections for John McDowell’s account of the Myth and argues that a better account can be extracted from Kant. I defend McDowell’s position (and reject Watkins’ Kantian account) by arguing that these objections are based on a failure to appreciate an implication of the claim (which Watkins accepts) that rational thought operates in “the logical space of reasons.” Specifically, I focus on the implication that a thinker must be in a position to understand the rational significance of her perceptual experience. Along the way I explain in what ways Watkins’ conception of the given in experience mirrors the view of Lewis. (shrink)

Bu makalede, bilim felsefecisi kimliğiyle tanınan Thomas Kuhn’un eğitim ve özellikle fen eğitimi alanındaki görüşlerine değinilmektedir. Fen eğitimi, bilim, bilimin doğası ve bilim uygulamaları hakkında düşünceler geliştirmeye odaklanarak fen öğrenimi için gerekli olan beceri ve anlayışın geliştirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Fen eğitiminin temel amaçlarından biri bilimin gerçek doğasının tespit edilmesi ve bu doğrultuda bir eğitim modelinin belirlenmesidir. Bu çerçevede Kuhn’un bilim tarihine yönelik incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü paradigma kavramı bilimin doğası ve fen eğitimi konusundaki görüşlerin değişimine yol açmıştır. Kuhn açısından fen (...) eğitimi yürürlükteki bilim yapma tarzının temelinde yatan paradigma ve öğretilerinin bilim insanlarına ve öğrencilere aktarılması sürecidir, bu nedenle fen eğitimi yalnızca olağan bilim döneminde mümkündür. Kuhn’un eğitim modeli, mevcut paradigmayla ilişkili olarak karşılaşılan bulmaca ya da sorunları çeşitli örneklerden hareketle tekrar tekrar çözmeye çalışan öğrenciler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir. Kuhn’un olağan bilimin sınırları içerisinde kalarak değerlendirdiği fen eğitimi anlayışı eleştirel düşünceyi engellediği iddiasıyla Karl Popper, John Watkins ve Richard Bailey tarafından katı, tutucu, dogmatik ve endoktrinasyonu vurgulayan bir eğitim anlayışı olarak görülmektedir. Bu çerçevede makalede, öncelikli olarak Kuhn’un bilimin doğası ve bilimin gelişim tarzına yönelik belirlemeleri doğrultusunda fen eğitimine yönelik düşünceleri ve bu düşüncelerin eğitim alanındaki yansımaları incelenmektedir. Ardından, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi üzerine görüşlerinin iddia edildiği gibi dogmatik bir yapıda olmadığı, endoktrinasyonu ya da zorla öğretimi vurgulamadığı, bu tür yorumların radikal bir yaklaşımdan öteye gidemediği ileri sürülmektedir. Son olarak makalede, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi anlayışının yalnızca bir durum tespiti ya da bir fen eğitimi tasviri olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiği düşüncesi ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. -/- In this article, Thomas Kuhn’s impact, who is known as a philosopher of science, on science education are mentioned. Science education aims to develop the skills and understanding necessary for science learning, with a focus on developing ideas about science and the nature of science. One of the main purposes of science education is to determine the true nature of science and to determine an education model in this direction. In this context, the concept of paradigm, which Kuhn put forward as a result of his studies on the history of science, has led to a change in views on the nature of science and science education. For Kuhn, science education is the process of conveying the paradigm underlying the current way of doing science to scientists and students because science education is possible only in the normal science period. Kuhn’s educational model is carried out through students who repeatedly try to solve puzzles or problems encountered in relation to the current paradigm. Kuhn’s understanding of science education is seen by Karl Popper, John Watkins and Richard Bailey as a rigid, conservative, dogmatic and indoctrinational education approach with the claim that it prevents critical thinking. In this context, the article primarily examines Kuhn’s thoughts on science education and the reflections of these thoughts in the field of education. Then, it is argued that Kuhn’s views on science education are not dogmatic as claimed, he does not emphasize indoctrination, and that such interpretations cannot go beyond a radical approach. Finally, in the article, it is emphasized that Kuhn’s understanding of science education should be evaluated only as a description of science education. (shrink)

Between 1937 and 1940 the Taxonomic Principles Committee of the newly-founded Association for the Study of Systematics in Relation to General Biology (later the Systematics Association) attempted to define the relationship between evolution and taxonomy. The people who took part in the discussion were W.T. Calman, C.R.P. Diver, J.S.L. Gilmour, J.S. Huxley, W.D. Lang, J.R. Norman, R. Melville, O.W. Richards, M.A. Smith, T.A. Sprague, H. Hamshaw Thomas, W.B. Turrill, B.P. Uvarov, A.F. Watkins, E.I. White, and A.J. Wilmott. Most of (...) the botanists asserted that taxonomy was a practical matter to be kept distinct from phylogenetic speculation, and most of the zoologists insisted that taxonomists must strive to represent evolution if they wished to be scientific. The disagreement seemed to be hardening rather than approaching compromise when World War Two stopped the committee's work. (shrink)

There is sometimes a sense in which one theory posits ‘less structure’ than another. Philosophers of science have recently appealed to this idea both in the debate about equivalence of theories and in discussions about structural parsimony. But there are a number of different proposals currently on the table for how to compare the ‘amount of structure’ that different theories posit. The aim of this paper is to compare these proposals against one another and evaluate them on their own merits.

Thomas Murray's graceful and humane book illuminates one of the most morally complex areas of everyday life: the relationship between parents and children. What do children mean to their parents, and how far do parental obligations go? What, from the beginning of life to its end, is the worth of a child? Ethicist Murray leaves the rarefied air of abstract moral philosophy in order to reflect on the moral perplexities of ordinary life and ordinary people. Observing that abstract moral (...) terms such as altruism and selfishness can be buried in the everyday doings of families, he maintains that ethical theory needs a richer description than it now has of the moral life of parents and children. How far should adults go in their quest for children? What options are available to women who do not want to bear a child now? Should couples be allowed to reject a child because of genetic disability or "wrong" gender? How can we weigh the competing claims of the genetic and the rearing parents to a particular child? _The Worth of a Child_ couples impressive learning with a conversational style. Only by getting down to cases, Murray insists, can we reach moral conclusions that are unsentimental, farsighted, and just. In an era of intense public and private acrimony about the place and meaning of "family values," his practical wisdom about extraordinary difficult moral issues offers compelling reading for both experienced and prospective parents, as well as for ethicists, social and behavioral scientists, and legal theorists. (shrink)

As the contract cheating market has become more sophisticated and competition has intensified, the contract cheating industry has had to redevelop its approach to gain custom. The industry has developed new models of internal operation and providers are using more sophisticated techniques to reach potential customers. This paper discusses contract cheating industry workflows and introduces terminology to allow complexities of the industry to be more consistently discussed. Examples are provided throughout to indicate the scale and challenge of the contract cheating (...) industry operations.An analysis of contract cheating operations on the micro-outsourcing website Fiverr.com is presented, using comparative data collected in June 2016 and October 2018. The analysis of the data demonstrates how the contract cheating industry is seeing continual change. Specifically, on Fiverr.com, this includes an increase in the number of providers offering essay writing services, particularly those from Kenya and Pakistan. The increase in service availability is accompanied by an associated reduction in essay pricing. The advertised pricing per 1000 words has dropped substantially, from $31.73 USD to $5.73 USD. The accounts used by contract cheating providers are also being replaced at an increased rate.Based on the data, contract cheating providers on Fiverr.com are currently estimated to be taking a minimum of $92,001 USD per year in revenue. This is an example calculated from only one search term on which contract cheating providers advertise on only one micro-outsourcing site used for contract cheating. The actual industry income from micro-outsourcing web sites is likely to be substantially higher. (shrink)

Many states recognize a legal right to bodily integrity, understood as a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s body. Recently, some have called for the recognition of an analogous legal right to mental integrity: a right against significant, nonconsensual interference with one’s mind. In this chapter, we describe and distinguish three different rationales for recognizing such a right. The first appeals to case-based intuitions to establish a distinctive duty not to interfere with others’ minds; the second holds that, if (...) we accept a legal right to bodily integrity, then we must, on pain of philosophical inconsistency, accept a case for an analogous right over the mind; and the third holds that recent technological developments create a need for a legal right to mental integrity. (shrink)

to appear in Larry May, ed., War and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Throughout his philosophical development, Wittgenstein was more concerned with language than with any other topic. No other philosopher has been as influential on our understanding of the deep problems surrounding language, and yet the true significance of his writing on the subject is difficult to assess, since most of the current debates regarding language tend to overlook his work. In this book, Thomas McNally shows that philosophers of language still have much to learn from Wittgenstein's later writings. The book (...) examines the finer details of his arguments while also clarifying their importance for debates outside the field of Wittgenstein studies. Presenting the issues thematically, the book explores how the arguments in the Philosophical Investigations remain relevant, compelling us to reflect in novel and challenging ways on the nature of language. (shrink)

The proliferation of new accounts of infused and acquired virtue in Thomas has brought much welcome attention to his understanding of the relationship between nature and grace. But the very originality of these interpretations has raised a multitude of unanswered questions and difficulties. For any of these accounts to be plausible, they must be accompanied by an account of the way in which Thomas thinks that the specifically one virtue of prudence considers the matter of all virtues, and (...) his statement that such prudence depends on a correct order to the ultimate end. The current disagreement over acquired moral virtue cannot be resolved until these related disagreements are adequately addressed. (shrink)

In this article I take on the “Transcendentalist Challenge” to naturalized phenomenology, highlighting how the ontological and methodological commitments of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy point in the direction of an integration of the transcendental and the scientific, thus making room for a productive exchange between philosophy and psychological science when it comes to understanding consciousness and its place in nature. Discussing various conceptions of naturalized phenomenology, I argue that what I call an “Integrationist View” is required if we are to make sense (...) of the possibility of productive exchange between phenomenology and the sciences. My main argument is that if we conceive of consciousness as a structure of behavior ontologically prior to the distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity and third- and first-person perspectives, we arrive at a view of the transcendental as not essentially separate from the domain of science, but rather as contingent organizational norms of empirical nature that are best illuminated through a dialectical exchange between phenomenological and scientific approaches. I end by showing how Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with the “Schneider case” in an example of such an integration. (shrink)

In August 2017, a group of activists erected in Ottawa's downtown a tent as a first overdose prevention site as a response to what the public and the activists perceived as an epidemic—a devastating wave of opioid and fentanyl overdoses in Canada. The Ontario premier was urged to declare an emergency that would provide increased funding for harm reduction and also send a message to survivors and families that the lives of their loved ones mattered. Thus, the discourses around the (...) so‐called opioid crisis used a language of moral sentiments to legitimate political action. This “new humanitarianism” is considered a priori as good, but in this article, I ask what is politically at stake if we base our actions on the logic of humanitarian reason. The new universalism of humanitarian organizations is based on the individualism of human rights and thus on a moral imperative that replaces the political. Initiatives like the OPS movement often fill the gaps in social services in the absence of the state and address social problems as emergencies and public health issues, thereby transforming them into medical problems—performing the medicalization of sociopolitical problems. This is what I call the NGOization of the opioid crisis. This form of humanitarianism is a universalism of the temporal present without any universal promise for a better future or the amelioration of human conditions—it is a humanitarianism of emergency. What characterizes new humanitarianism is that it responds to situations of suffering that are the result of increasing inequality and injustices without addressing the root causes of this suffering. Not addressing these causes means to be complicit in perpetuating the inequalities and to restrict visions of possible alternatives. (shrink)

The contributions to volume 8 of the Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism pursue from various perspectives the multifarious relations of German Idealism to the natural sciences and mathematics. The concepts of nature and of the basis for mathematics develop complexly in German philosophy after Kant. At issue are: the foundation of mathematics; the relation of freedom to nature; the significance of philosophy to emerging research in biology, chemistry, and physics, and reconsideration of the thought of Leibniz (...) and Spinoza. Contributors: Gideon Freudenthal, Michael Friedman, Hans-Peter Neumann, Wolfgang Neuser, Konstantin Pollok, Sebastian Rand, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Thomas Sturm, Lars-Thade Ulrichs, Eric Watkins, John Zammito, Paul Ziche, Rachel Zuckert. (shrink)

Double-effect reasoning (DER) is attributed to Aquinas "tout court". Aquinas's account, however, differs from contemporary DER insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of "risking" an assailant's life while contemporary accounts focus on actions causing harm inevitably. Since one cannot claim to risk the inevitable, and since there is a significant difference between risking harm and causing harm inevitably. Thomas's account does not extend to cases of inevitable harm. Thus, the received understanding of Aquinas's account is flawed and (...) leads to untenable attributions of the direction of intention to Aquinas and to misunderstandings of contemporary DER. (shrink)

This volume comprises essays presented to Alvin Plantinga on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

With each of our three criminal-law topics—defining offenses, apprehending suspects, and establishing punishments—we feel, I believe, strong moral resistance to the idea that our practices should be settled by a prospective-participant perspective. This becomes quite clear when we look at how the “reforms” suggested by institutional viewing might combine once we consider all three topics together: imagine a more extensive and swifter use of the death penalty in homicide cases coupled with somewhat lower standards of evidence; or think of backing (...) a strict-liability criminal statute with the death penalty. Of course, such “reforms” would increase the execution of innocents; but, their proponents will tell us, any penal system involves the punishment of some innocents, and, if it provides for the death penalty, the execution of some innocents. Moreover, why is it worse for innocents to be punished than for innocents to suffer an equivalent harm in some other way? Formulated from a prospective-participant perspective: Why not run a small risk of being innocently executed in exchange for reducing, much more significantly, the risk of dying prematurely in other ways? (shrink)

Time-limited trials of intensive care have arisen in response to the increasing demand for intensive care treatment for patients with a low chance of surviving their critical illness, and the clinical uncertainty inherent in intensive care decision-making. Intensive care treatment is reported by most patients to be a significantly unpleasant experience. Therefore, patients who do not survive intensive care treatment are exposed to a negative dying experience. Time-limited trials of intensive care treatment in patients with a low chance of surviving (...) have both a small chance of benefiting this patient group and a high chance of harming them by depriving them of a good death. A ‘rule of rescue’ for the critically unwell does not justify time-limiting a trial of intensive care treatment and overlooks the experiential costs that intensive care patients face. Offering time-limited trials of intensive care to all patients, regardless of their chance of survival, overlooks the responsibility of resource-limited intensive care clinicians for suffering caused by their actions. A patient-specific risk–benefit analysis is vital when deciding whether to offer intensive care treatment, to ensure that time-limited trials of intensive care are not undertaken for patients who have a much higher chance of being harmed, rather than benefited by the treatment. The virtue ethics concept of human flourishing has the potential to offer additional ethical guidance to resource-limited clinicians facing these complex decisions, involving the balancing of a quantifiable survival benefit against the qualitative suffering that intensive care treatment may cause. (shrink)

There is no arguing the impact of Inoue Tetsujirō on the development of philosophy in Japan from the Meiji Restoration through the end of the Pacific War. He was the first Japanese to receive a doctorate in philosophy from Germany and the first native-born chair of the philosophy department at Tokyo Imperial University, the training center for almost all the major Japanese philosophers who graduated before 1915. Inoue was instrumental in making German idealism the Western philosophy of choice for Japan, (...) but he also appreciated Asian traditions as well, having no qualms about claiming there was true philosophy in India, China, and premodern Japan. He set the foundation for academic philosophy in Japan not so much through his own rather simplistic personal philosophy, but especially through his contributions to the organization of the field. This article focuses mainly on Inoue’s troubled relation with Confucianism. On one hand, in seeking a premodern philosophy to serve as the bedrock for modern Japan, Inoue looked to the Edo-period Confucian traditions originating in China. He divided them into Shushigaku, Yōmeigaku, and what he named Kogaku, the school focusing on classical texts preceding neo-Confucian developments and interpretations. In many respects, like so many others of his generation, Inoue was by training and personal preference a Confucian. That is not the whole story, however. Inoue understood Confucianism’s primary purpose as cultivating the social values and order that would ensure an efficient society of human flourishing, stability, and harmony. Yet, he also likely suspected that the people of the new Japan, with its modernization and plethora of Western ideas, would not unquestioningly accept the authority of the Confucian classics, nor be willing to undertake the rigors of textual study that are the hallmark of the Confucian scholar. In Edo-period Japan, that study had been the responsibility of the samurai class, but in their democratization program, the Meiji reformers had abolished the old class system. Education of the young would now shift from the Confucian academies to the new public school system. Always cooperative with the government to the point of being obsequious, Inoue took a leading role in the National Morality program and its installment in the nationwide school curriculum. That curriculum combined a Shinto-based reverence for the sacred nature of the emperor in the kokutai ideology along with practical moralistic values that could be loosely called Confucian. Yet, if schooling for most was limited to the elementary level and if there was no longer a samurai class to oversee the moral behavior of the society, who could nurture and enforce the moral order? Through a set of fortuitous events, Inoue “discovered” bushidō, the Way of the warrior. If there were no longer a samurai warrior class, perhaps all Japanese could become de facto samurai—at least in their mindset. Most may no longer have the scholarly skills and time to glean their spiritual and moral insights from Confucian texts. Yet, they could find the virtues of loyalty, sincerity, filiality, and compliance with seniority within the distinctively mindful heart and spirit of ancient Japan carried within the Japanese bloodline. What happened to the Confucianism of Inoue Tetsujirō? Some of its values were absorbed into bushidō and National Morality, but the praxis of the Confucian scholar and the ideal of the kunshi seem to have been lost, much to Japan’s detriment. (shrink)

States of Consciousness extends Thomas Natsoulas' development of the psychology of consciousness by giving sustained attention to the stream of consciousness and its component 'pulses of experience'. Natsoulas' unrivalled scholarship across psychology, philosophy and cognate fields means that very often surprising connections are made between the works of leading theorists of consciousness, including Brentano, Mead, Bergmann, Strawson, James, Freud, Skinner, Hebb, Gibson, O'Shaughnessy and Woodruff Smith. At a time when interest in consciousness and the brain is growing rapidly, this (...) book provides an in-depth analysis of sophisticated psychological accounts that pertain to consciousness. Its breadth of coverage and interdisciplinary nature will be of interest to postgraduates and specialists in a range of fields, particularly the history of psychology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)